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Digest: Greene v. Marin County Flood
Control and Water Conservation District
Christopher L. Tinen
Opinion by Moreno, J., with George, C.J., Kennard, Chin,
Corrigan, JJ., Reardon, J.,1 and Raye, J.2
Issue
Are special fee elections subject to the secret voting
requirements in Article II, section 7 of the California
Constitution?
Facts
The Marin County Flood Control and Water Conservation
District (District) proposed that a new storm drainage fee be
imposed on property owners in an area with a history of chronic
flooding.3 The proposal called for a fee amount per property
owner based on the size and type of parcel owned.4 The Marin
County Board of Supervisors accepted the proposal, adopted
written protest procedures, scheduled a public hearing on the fee,
and directed mailing of notices to affected property owners—all
pursuant to Article XIIID, section 6, of the California
Constitution.5 No majority protest was presented at the public
hearing, and the Board scheduled a special election on the fee to
be held solely by mailed ballot.6
The ballot mailed to the affected property owners consisted
of instructions on one side, the ballot on the other, and contained
the name and address of the property owner, the exact amount of
the fee to be imposed, and a designated space for a signature.7
Returned ballots were received and placed unopened in a “lock
1 Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
2 Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
3 Greene v. Marin Cnty. Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist., 231 P.3d 350,
352 (Cal. 2010).
4 Id.
5 Id. at 352–53 (citing CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 6).
6 Id. at 353.
7 Id.
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box,” and were not opened until all the ballots were due.8 The fee
proposal passed by a slim margin, with roughly twenty percent of
the ballots invalidated due to a lack of signature.9
Ford Greene, a property owner in the District who voted in
the election, demanded a recount of the election results pursuant
to Elections Code section 15620 and then, receiving no response
from the District, filed a “Verified Complaint for an Election
Contest” pursuant to the Elections Code.10 Greene’s main
complaint was that the notice given to the voters did not
adequately inform them of the signature requirement due to its
inconspicuous size and lack of bold font.11 He further alleged
that, as a result of this defect, twenty-one percent of the votes
cast—in contrast to the usual one percent invalidation rate in
Marin County elections—were invalidated.12
The District denied the allegations in its answer, and both
parties stipulated to proceed solely on the pleadings and the face
of the ballot, thus waiving an evidentiary hearing.13 Several
other citizen groups intervened, requesting declaratory relief
that the election was lawful.14 Greene answered the intervention
with an affirmative defense that the signature requirement
violated the ballot secrecy requirement of Article II, section 7 of
the California Constitution.15
The trial court denied Greene’s election contest in its
entirety, holding that the requirement to sign ballots was
expressly authorized by Article XIIID of the California
Constitution.16 On appeal, the Court of Appeal framed the issue
to be decided differently.17 Rather than focusing on the signature
requirement, the Court of Appeal noted that Greene’s central
legal argument had always been that Article II, section 7’s secret
voting requirement applies to an Article XIIID, section 6(c) fee
election.18 Proceeding on this basis, the Court of Appeal reversed
the trial court, concluding that the secret voting requirement did
apply to the fee election at issue and that the District’s

8
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17
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Id.
Id.
Id. See also CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 16100–16101 (West 2010).
Greene, 231 P.3d at 353.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing CAL. CONST. art. II, § 7).
Id. at 353.
Id.
Id. at 353–54.
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procedures did not adequately protect voter privacy.19 The
District petitioned the California Supreme Court for review.20
Analysis
The court analyzed Proposition 218 and Government Code
section 53753 et seq. to determine the underlying constitutional
and statutory scheme of Article XIIID, section 6.21 Proposition
218 was adopted as an addition to Proposition 13, which acted to
cut local property taxes by prohibiting local municipalities from
enacting any special tax without a two-thirds vote of the
electorate.22 Particularly, Proposition 218 added Articles XIIIC
and XIIID to the California Constitution, which extended the
reach of Proposition 13’s limitations on property and special
taxes to analogous special fees and assessments.23
The court then looked to Article XIIID, section 4, which sets
forth in considerable detail the procedures for adopting
assessments.24 Specifically, subdivision (d) provides that notice
be mailed to owners of identified parcels which shall contain the
property owner’s name, a reasonable identification of the parcel,
and either support or opposition to the proposed assessment.25
Article XIIID, section 6 provides a somewhat different procedure
for property related fee assessments.26 The court noted that
section 6 provides that “an agency may adopt procedures similar
to those for increases in assessments in the conduct of elections
under this subdivision.”27
Shortly after passage of Proposition 218, the legislature
passed Government Code section 53753, which was designed to
facilitate the implementation of Proposition 218.28 Section 53753
did not contain provisions for assessment ballot secrecy as
originally enacted.29 Further, the court noted that the statute
expressly provided that assessment ballots would be signed, but
would not amount to voting for purposes of Article II of the
California Constitution or the California Elections Code.30 The
19
20
21

Id. at 354.
Id.
Id. (citing RIGHT TO VOTE ON TAXES ACT; CAL. GOV. CODE § 53753 et seq. (West

22
23
24

CAL. CONST. art. XIIIC–D.
Id.
Greene, 231 P.3d at 354–55 (citing CAL. CONST. art. XIIID § 4).
CAL. CONST. art. XIIID § 4(d).
§ 6.
Greene, 231 P.3d at 355 (citing CAL. CONST. art. XIIID § 6).
Id. at 355 (citing CAL. GOV. CODE § 53753).
Id.
Id. (citing former CAL. GOV. CODE § 53753(c), (e)(4), as enacted by 38 Stat. 5

2010)).
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(1997)).
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court noted that section 53753 was amended three years later to
provide a certain measure of assessment ballot secrecy prior to
being tabulated, but that the ballots were to be made public
record thereafter.31
The court then examined the extent of the voting secrecy
requirements under Article II, section 7 of the California
Constitution.32 This section provides that “voting shall be secret”
and the “right to a secret ballot . . . is the very foundation of our
elections system.”33 The court noted that although these secrecy
requirements have been uniformly applied to candidate elections,
initiatives, and referenda, other types of elections have not been
invariably subjected to the constitutional right of secrecy.34 For
support, the court looked to Alden v. Superior Court, where the
court of Appeal concluded that an election to form a water
district was not bound by the constitutional secrecy requirements
of Article II, section 7 because “the creation of such a district is a
legislative act.”35 The court in Alden also cited Tarpey v.
McClure, which upheld the constitutionality of an act that
provided for a formation election in which only property owners
were entitled to vote.36 The court in Tarpey made it clear that
the formation of a water storage district is “a function pertaining
purely to the legislative branch of the government” and thus
could not be challenged based on the constitutional right to a
secret ballot.37
The court next turned to whether and to what extent special
assessment balloting requires secrecy under Proposition 218 and
Article XIIID.38 The court pointed out that the Court of Appeal
did not decide whether Article XIIID, section 4 required secret
voting.39 Instead, the Court of Appeal reasoned that “an agency
could comply with Article XIIID, section 4 while maintaining
secrecy in voting.”40 However, the question is not whether
secrecy could be maintained, but rather whether it is required.41
In order to discern the requirements of secrecy under Article
XIIID, section 4, the court began a constitutional construction
analysis.42 First, the court looked to the face of the constitutional
31
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Id. at 355–56.
Id. at 356–57.
Id. at 356 (quoting Scott v. Kenyon, 16 Cal. 2d 197, 201 (1940)).
Greene, 231 P.3d at 356.
Alden v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. App. 2d 764, 770 (1963).
Tarpey v. McClure, 190 Cal. 593 (1923).
Id. at 606.
Greene, 231 P.3d at 357.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 358.
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text to give the words their ordinary meaning.43 As the court
previously noted, section 4 provides that the ballot must be one
in which the property owner indicates their name, an
identification of the parcel, and their support of or opposition to
the proposed assessment.44 The court inferred that the ballot
requirements suggest that these pieces of information will
appear on a single piece of paper.45 Furthermore, section 4
requires that the ballots must be tabulated at a public hearing,
which weighs in favor of interpreting section 4 to authorize nonsecret voting.46
Recognizing a lack of explicit language in section 4, the court
consulted “contemporaneous constructions” of the constitutional
provision made by the legislature to assess their judgment as to
its appropriate reach.47
Specifically, the court noted that
Government Code section 53753, enacted to address the
implementation of section 4, provides that the secrecy provisions
of Article II, section 7 of the California Constitution do not apply
to the assessment ballot procedures prescribed in section 4.48
The court further noted that section 53753 “was later amended to
specifically address voter secrecy requirements,” but did not alter
the voter identification provisions of assessment ballots.49
Therefore, the court concluded that section 4 authorizes a ballot
that indicates a property owner’s vote, name, and parcel while
allowing public disclosure of the ballots once due.50
Finally, the court compared section 4 of Article XIIID to
section 6 to determine the kinds of balloting procedures set forth
in section 4 that may have been incorporated into section 6
elections.51 The court analyzed the subdivisions of both sections
and determined that the notice provisions and rules for public
hearings are similar in both sections, but section 6 does not have
any provision regarding the composition of the ballot to be sent to
property owners in the event of a special fee election.52 The court
inferred from the plain language of section 6 that “procedures
similar to those for increases in assessments in the conduct of
elections under this subdivision” includes the use of a ballot

43
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing CAL. GOV. CODE § 53753).
Id. at 359 (citing CAL. GOV. CODE § 53753).
Id. at 359.
Id.
Id. (citing CAL. CONST. art XIID, §§ 4, 6).
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similar to the one used in section 4.53 As previously discussed,
the ballot set forth in section 4 includes voter identification of
both name and property of the voter on the ballot.54 Therefore, in
the absence of explicit language or legislative history to the
contrary, the court concluded that section 6 also authorizes a
ballot with voter self-identification.55
Holding
The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and
remanded the case with directions to reinstate the judgment of
the trial court.56 The court held that there was no basis for
invalidating the fee election at issue due to its compliance with
the required measures of Article XIIID, section 6.57 Whether or
not greater protective measures or voter assurances could have
given the ballot heightened secrecy was deemed immaterial.58
Therefore, the secrecy requirements employed by the District
were sufficient to constitute a valid fee election.59
Legal Significance
The court’s decision excludes special fee elections from the
secrecy requirements provided to candidate elections, initiatives,
and referenda under the California Constitution. This ruling
precludes property owners from invalidating special assessment
elections on the grounds that it violates their right to a secret
ballot insofar as it complies with the procedures and provisions of
Article XIIID, enacted by the passage of Proposition 218.

53
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Id. (quoting CAL. CONST. art XIIID, § 6).
Id. at 360 (citing CAL. CONST. art XIID, § 4).
Id. at 360.
Id. at 364–65.
Id. at 364.
Id.
Id.

